Oh King Coal!
Energy policy is based largely on predictions of what we think will happen in the future. It has to be. We need to know how factors such as prices, technologies, geopolitics and environmental damage are likely to play out. This is the world of the educated guess, the modeler, and scenarios. Almost all energy policy publications refer to some scenario-building, and one of the common features between them is the expected future role of coal.
The formula is simple. Coal is dirty and should be phased out; but there is loads of it and it is cheaper than all other energy sources. This means that it is good for the economy and for security of supply. Hence, we should not ban it, but we should clean it up and tax it a bit to account for externalities. Plugging this formula into the models delivers the result that coal becomes the default fallback option in all scenarios that limit the amount of renewables or envisage oil price rises. The educated guess is that if we can just can just get cleaner coal (preferably with CCS) we needn't worry too much about the expense of a global renewables roll-out, the dilemma of nuclear, or peak oil. After all, you can always make oil from coal.
An initial glance at the statistics seems to support this. Picking the headline data from BP it seems there are 294 years of coal left at current consumption. BP are also consistent with the price trend story, as can be seen from this graph for which I used their figures.
As a result of this data input, the IEA World Energy Outlook reference scenario says that "coal sees the biggest increase in demand in absolute terms, jumping by 73% between 2005 and 2030". Last year's UK Energy White Paper actually revised its scenarios due to the comparitive fuel price divergence. "The price of coal" it says, "is now more favourable compared with that in the July 2006 projections. This contributes to an increase in coal capacity in the new baseline of up to 8GW by 2020". The IPCC takes a similar line: "Coal is unevenly distributed, but remains abundant. It can be converted to liquids, gases, heat and power, although more intense utilization will demand viable CCS technologies...The share of liquids will probably remain constant but with a gradual transition from conventional oil, toward coal-to-liquids, unconventional oils and modern biomass".
The assertion is clear. Coal is the big reserve and although it is finite, we don't need to treat it as such yet. We have come a long way from the panic of British economist William Stanley Jevons who foresaw the peak oil debate with a treatise on peak UK coal in 1865. In The Coal Question he observed that coal was finite, that demand seemd exponential and technology was creating a rebound effect. He was right to worry about UK coal production, which peaked in 1913, but reserves in the rest of the world are now able to balance demand. Or are they?
Last year a group of academics at the Energy Watch Group reported on global coal reserves, and in the last fortnight the National Academy of Sciences reviewed US reserves. The conclusions were that the available data is of highly dubious quality but recent downgrading of reserves indicated that peak coal could be a reailty as early as 2025. For example, in 1997 Poland downgraded its reserves by 50%, and Germany by 99% in 2004! This would mean that none of the World Energy Outlook scenarios could be met without an increase in the proportion of dirtier brown coal, and that prices of all fuels would most likely rise more rapidly.
As we've discussed on the blog before, the high prices delivered by peak fossil fuel production might put renewables and energy efficiency measures at an advantage. Renewables are even more favoured when you take into account that the global centres of power (US, China etc.) do not coincide with where the oil will be coming from in future. The worrisome thing about coal is that the big reserves lie in the powerful areas of the US, China and Russia (who may become the swing producer for coal and gas). These are countries without a great record on environmentalism and a tendency to subsidise energy in favour of growth.
Drawing conclusions from all this is tricky as always. It's possible that reduced coal reserves could ease the tension between economic growth and climate goals in the rich world, but it could be a disaster for developing countries banking on cheap solid fuels. Also, a tighter coal market would surely make it politically more difficult to sustain an articificial carbon market unless renewables were very cheaply available, especially since it could easily make CCS highly uneconomic.
Whatever the reality, it is evident that scenario-builders should incorporate better information on reserves rather than just relying on coal as a cheap fallback option. Investing in renewables and nuclear may suddenly look like an even better insurance policy than it does now. Then we just need policy makers to be honest about how expensive energy is likely to get for everyone. Easy.
























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