In the more exciting moments of my day I like nothing more
than to have a little wonder about oil and gas supplies. Often this is from the
point of view of how it impacts raw materials for the chemical industry.
Recently I read a few interesting things that I’ll try to put into some
perspective here*.
There has been news about new discoveries. Brazil,
we are told, is about to become ‘the new oil superpower’ due to its recent discovery of 5-8 billion barrels of
light oil and gas, the biggest discovery since 12 billion barrels in Kazakstan
in 2000. Disagreements between Cyprus
and Turkey
continue to surface over Turkish access to Cypriot gas discoveries. Cyprus is
thought to have discovered 4-10 billion barrels of recoverable oil and gas, which it says could power the
island almost indefinitely, so it is converting its power stations from oil to
natural gas. It is also courting foreign firms to build an offshore LNG
terminal, so much of the gas will never actually make it onshore. So, if these
big new discoveries are shipped to the international market, what is the impact
on our ability to meet demand?
In a couple of weeks the IEA formally unveils its World
Energy Outlook 2007, but we already have
the executive summary.
Not much has changed since last year, and the ‘base case’ and ‘alternative
policy’ scenarios are familiar. In the base case global oil demand to 2030
rises to 42 billion barrels per year from 31 in 2005, whilst with the
alternative policy (new technologies, climate action) it only grows to 37. In
the base case gas demand reaches 28 billion barrels compared to 17 in 2005.
This tells us that the Brazilian, Cypriot and Kazakh finds (if mostly oil rather than gas) would support us for almost a year in 2005 but for just 42 weeks in 2030 in the
most optimistic case (the upper limit is recoverable, alternative policy scenario). But, of course this is unlikely to be the case as
discovered fields are rarely fully exploited. Taking a less optimistic approach
(base case, lower limits) these three big finds since 2000 might
not last 6 months in 2030. That is, if Brazil's
deep sea reserves can actually come on line anytime soon when they are 4.5
miles below the surface and the technologies still need to be developed to
extract them.
New discoveries need to replace expiration of existing
reserves and also meet new demand. The huge Kazakh field meets base case demand
growth over the coming 25 years. What is needed is a replacement for the >85
billion barrels currently being used each day.
Peter Davies, ex-BP economist and still BP-payrolled,
doesn’t think we need to worry. I went to a presentation in which his main points from an economist’s perspective were:
- Peak Oil is not a problem because Hubbert’s Gaussian
distribution is inaccurate if you include unconventionals and new discoveries
due to new technologies;
- Oil will peak, however, due to physical limits;
- An economist cannot account for physical limits, but history
tells us that unconventionals and new technologies will respond to price
signals and overcome physical constraints.
But what if these technologies are unable to come online in
time? An interesting study by Robelius that looks at the decline in production and discovery of so-called Giant Fields
(>0.5 billion barrels) is sadly pessimistic. It says that during 2005, a
year with the highest oil price in over 20 years, only 11.5 billion barrels
were discovered in new fields and 9 billion barrels as additions to existing
reserves. This was almost 10 billion barrels less than the produced volume that
year. If technologies for discovery are not responding fast enough to price
signals, what about unconventional reserves? On a technical basis Robelius
calculates that optimistic output from the largest oil sand deposits in Alberta could physically get up to 2 billion barrels per year by 2040. Not much of a
stop gap while we look for alternatives, and this discounts the possibility
that investment is discouraged due to a carbon price.
Perhaps more frighteningly, Robelius tells us that existing
reserve estimates are levelling rather than being revised upwards due to new
technological capabilities. Instead, last year it was revealed that Kuwait may
be overestimating its reserves by stating them as 101.5 (the number used by BP) rather than 48 billion barrels.
A difference of 53.5 billion barrels, potentially dwarfing all discoveries this Century.
I haven’t really mentioned peak oil arguments here, because
they have become quite confused by poor interpretation of price signals and a
focus on physical natural resource limits. Whilst the physical limits are real,
they are compounded by the problem of adjusting to a world in which the race
for new reserves needs to be more frantic. To date this race between depletion
and new technologies has not been lost for any mineral, but the IEA and Total
predict some serious supply constraints by 2015 with no relief for oil prices.
It is the speed of adjustment that is crucial. The speed at which discoveries
are made, at which new regions are opened to exploration, and at which new
technologies enable extraction in hostile environments. At the moment we seem
to be losing, and yet economists continue to be optimistic based on the
long-term, rather than short-term, feasibility of adjustment.
For a comparison of arguments used by peak oil researchers and
energy economists, see a paper in this month’s Energy Policy by Bentley et al. of Reading University.
In my next post I will take a similarly quick and non-expert
look at coal reserves, which I have also been reading about, and which are no
rosier.
* I’ll do my best not to mention that the oil price yesterday hit
$99.29 for light, sweet crude.
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